Message Text

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TAGS: PGOV JO EG US XF

SUBJECT: SADAT, HUSSEIN AND THE PEACE PROCESS

REF: (A) AMMAN 5861 (B) CAIRO 16319

- 1. IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT OF LATE OPTED FOR CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE JORDANIANS ON THE PEACE PROCESS. REASON IS THAT, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, SADAT CONSIDERS HUSSEIN WEAK, INDECISIVE AND AN OPPORTUNIST. HE IS FED UP WITH WHAT HE PERCEIVES TO BE HUSSEIN'S LACK OF COURAGE AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME. AS HE AGAIN PUT IT TO VP MONDALE, HUSSEIN WANTS EGYPT TO DO HIS "DIRTY WORK" FOR HIM. OR, AS HE HAS PUT IT ON OTHHR OCCASIONS, HUSSEIN WANTS A SOLUTION ON "A GOLDEN PLATTER". WHEN AND IF THIS IS ACHIEVED, HUSSEIN WILL COME "GALLOPING INTO THE PICTURE".
- 2. ALTHOUGH FONMIN KAMEL STILL HARBORS SOME HOPE OF BRINGING THE JORDANIANS INTO THE NEGOTIATING PICTURE, SADAT SEEMS TO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT CHANCES ARE NOT VERY GOOD THAT THE KING WILL SCREW UP HIS COURAGE AND RISK INCURRING SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN IRE. THE LAST SECRET

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HUSSEIN/MUBARAK CONVERSATION FIASCO, IN WHICH MUBARAK CAME BACK APPARENTLY BELIEVING THAT HUSSEIN HAD AGREED TO SUPPORT THE SADAT PROPOSAL AND THE JORDANIANS SUBSEQUENTLY HAD A DIFFERENT VERSION, HAS NOT ENCOURAGED SADAT TO TAKE ANY MORE CHARITABLE VIEW OF HUSSEIN'S RELIABILITY. MUBARAK MAY NOT HAVE BEEN THE BEST REPORTER, BUT SADAT TRUSTS HIM MORE THAN HE DOES HUSSEIN.

HOPEFULLY, THE RECENT ENDORSEMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN COUNTERPROPOSAL BY JORDANIAN MININFO MAY GIVE SADAT A WARMER FEELING TOWARD THE JORDANIANS.

- 3. KAMEL'S ACCOUNT OF HIS TALK WITH MINSTATE HASSAN IBRAHIM IS SET FORTH PARA 3 OF REF B. KAMEL CERTAINLY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE MESSAGE HE PASSED ON WAS "RELAX, TIME IS NOT READY FOR JORDAN TO GET INVOLVED". ON THE CONTRARY, HE BELIEVES THAT HE MADE A PITCH TO IBRAHIM THAT JORDAN SHOULD PARTICIPATE AND GAINED IMPRESSION LATTER MIGHT BE WILLING TO DO SO IF HUSSEIN HAD SOME KIND OF "GUARANTEES" AS TO THE OUTCOME OF THE WEST BANK. PERHAPS IBRAHIM INTERPRETED KAMEL'S MESSAGE IN THE FASHION REPORTED REF A, BUT THAT WAS CERTAINLY NOT ITS INTENTION.
- 4. THIS SAID, I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THE IDEA OF SAYING A WORD TO THE EGYPTIANS ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF A LITTLE MORE CONSULTATION AND HAND-HOLDING WITH THE JORDANIANS. I AM NOT SURE THAT THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN IS THE BEST VEHICLE SINCE, REGARDLESS OF HIS PERSONAL MERITS, HE IS NOT ONE OF SADAT'S INNER CIRCLE. I WILL MAKE THE POINT TO VP MUBARAK, WHOM I HOPE TO SEE TOMORROW, JULY 12, AND ALSO TO KAMEL WHEN HE GETS BACK. EXTENT TO WHICH SADAT IS WILLING TO CARRY ON SUSTAINED CONSULTATIONS AND SECRET

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HAND-HOLDING WITH HUSSEIN WILL BE THE GOVERNING FACTOR IN WHAT KAMEL IS ABLE TO DO IN THIS REGARD AND, AS INDICATED ABOVE, SADAT'S PRESENT PERCEPTION OF THE UTILITY OF CLOSER CONSULTATIONS WITH HUSSEIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES IS NOT VERY HIGH. IF HUSSEIN WANTS EGYPTIANS TREAT HIM AS MORE OF AN EQUAL, HE WILL BE WELL ADVISED DO MORE THAN GIVE WISE COUNSEL TO ANY AND ALL WHO WILL LISTEN AND LOOK FOR WAYS IN WHICH HE CAN PLAY AN ACTIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN CURRENT ME PEACE PROCESS. SADAT HAS TAKEN A PRETTY BIG RISK AND IF HUSSEIN WANTS TO PLAY IN THIS BALL GAME, IN WHICH HE COULD BE THE PRINCIPAL BENEFICIARY, IT SHOULD NOT BE TOO MUCH TO ASK HIM TO TAKE A SMALL CHANCE HERE AND THERE HIMSELF.

5. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, FORMER NASSER AIDE HASSAN SABRI AL-KHOLY, WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM LONDON WHERE HE MET WITH HUSSEIN, TOLD ME TODAY HE HAD SELDOM SEEN THE KING LOOK SO GLUM. EILTS

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